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PROPAGATING GENDER STASIS: JUDICIAL INDIFFERENCE
AND THE MEDICAL MODEL OF GENDER IN REQUESTS FOR
STATE MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
By D. Andrew Quigley'
Abstract
From the time the American Psychiatric
Association ("APA") first included "transsexualism"
in its authoritative Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual ("DSM") in 1980, transgender litigants
have increasingly relied on medical diagnoses and
definitions to bolster their gender-related claims.
Relying on this "medical model of gender" requires
transgender litigants to adopt essentialist notions of
gender and accept conservative gender norms, both
of which generally contradict common beliefs within
the gender-variant community. While the medical
model may have once been justified as a means to
achieving otherwise-unattainable legal vindication,
the model's cost-benefit calculus no longer tips in the
gender-variant litigant's favor.
This paper analyzes the current legal
framework for individuals diagnosed with Gender
Identity Disorder ("GID") and who rely on the
state for medical assistance. The framework reveals
an implicit judicial deference to administrative
authorities that is inversely related to the patient's
socioeconomic status; that is, as the socioeconomic
status of the patient falls - from an individual who
does not benefit from government-funded programs
to a "categorically needy" Medicaid recipient to a
prison inmate - courts increasingly defer to the (mis)
judgments of the administrative officials charged with
disbursing medical funds.
This paper argues that the implicit judicial
deference in this context signals nothing less than
indifference to gender and gender expression as
concepts distinct from anatomical sex. It follows,
then, that, given this judicial indifference, gender-
variant litigants should abandon the medical model
because it serves only to freeze gender-variant persons
in restrictive conceptions of gender.
Introduction
Gender Identity Disorder ("GID") is a
medical condition marked by a feeling of disjunction
between one's anatomical sex and one's self-perceived
gender.2 Since the American Psychiatric Association
("APA") added "transsexualism" to the third edition
of its authoritative Diagnostics and Statistical Manual
("DSM") in the 1980s, gender-variant individuals
have increasingly relied on medical definitions and
physician testimony to legitimize and bolster their
gender-related legal claims. Though this "medical
model of gender" requires gender-variant individuals
to acknowledge gender boundaries and adopt
essentialist definitions of "male" and "female," many
gender-variant individuals accept this requirement
in the belief that the legal benefits the model affords
outweigh the social costs the model imposes.3
A careful examination of the medical
model as it is applied to individuals with GID who
depend on the state for medical funding for gender-
reassignment surgery ("GRS") demonstrates that
the cost-benefit calculus of the medical model has
shifted: today, a medical diagnosis is a necessary but
insufficient condition for obtaining state funds to
treat GID. Once a medical expert determines that
GRS is "medically necessary" to treat a gender-variant
patient's severe distress, administrators and judges
scrutinize the expert's determinations and make
their own judgments as to the actual necessity of the
prescribed surgery.
Third-party scrutiny of treatments prescribed
for individuals who receive healthcare funding
from the state is to be expected to a certain degree
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because of the administrative and legal structures
governing the individual. A prisoner, for example,
must request treatment from the Department of
Corrections ("DOC"), which has its own standards
for determining what conditions warrant medical
treatment. If the DOC denies the prisoner's request,
the prisoner's only legal recourse is an Eighth
Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need.' The situation is similar for
a non-incarcerated "categorically needy" Medicaid
recipient: an individual who qualifies as "categorically
needy" under a state's Medicaid statute' must appeal to
the state's Medicaid administrator for treatment and,
if the administrator denies the request, the Medicaid
recipient can bring a due process claim.7 Finally, a non-
incarcerated, non-categorically needy individual who
can front the cost of a gender-reassignment operation
also faces administrative structures: a taxpayer who
is not dependent on the state for medical assistance
may appeal to the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
and may use tax laws as the basis of a claim that a
particular medical treatment can be deducted as a
medical expense from the taxpayer's income.8
While the prisoner's burden is greater than
the burden faced by both non-incarcerated individuals
who can front the cost of a gender-reassignment
operation,' there is an aspect to each cause of action
that is not written into the law. This unwritten element
is the amount of judicial deference courts afford to
an administrative authority. The disparity in judicial
deference becomes apparent through a comparison of
cases addressing the necessity of GRS for individuals
in each of these three socioeconomic classes. These
cases display an implicit deference to administrative
authority that is, perhaps coincidentally, inversely
correlated to the gender-variant individual's
socioeconomic status. In other words, as the status
of the individual requesting medical treatment sinks
- from non-incarcerated, non-categorically needy
individual to non-incarcerated categorically needy
individual to prisoner - the judicial deference to the
authority charged with administering medical funds
to such individuals increases."o
This Note argues that tethering deference
to decreased socioeconomic status"' provides an
approximate "weight" to the judicial balancing of
an individual's interest in gender expression and the
relevant administrative decision-making authority.
On the one hand, an individual's interest in gender
expression is significant enough that GRS paid for by
an individual is not characterized as merely "cosmetic"
and merits a tax deduction." On the other hand,
an individual's interest in gender expression is not
significant enough to hold prison officials accountable
for failing to take seriously the extreme distress a
prisoner attributes to her inability to obtain GRS."
This differential signals a certain amount of judicial
indifference to gender expression - an indifference
that cannot be overcome by medical diagnoses and
physician testimony. To put it differently, in a case
involving tax deductions for gender-reassignment
surgery, the gender-variant individual has already
deducted the procedure from taxable income, and
the judge's role is merely to approve or disapprove
of that deduction: there is relatively little at stake,
and medical diagnoses and physician testimony have
sufficient authority to overcome the state's competing
interests. In an Eighth Amendment claim, however,
the gender-variant individual has not yet undergone
gender-reassignment surgery, and his or her only
means of obtaining the procedure is through proving
fault; thus, the value of gender-reassignment surgery,
taking in to account medical diagnoses and physician
testimony, is weighed against the cost of finding prison
officials liable for acting with deliberate indifference
to the prisoner's medical needs: here, there is more at
stake, and medical diagnoses and physician testimony
fail to overcome the state's interests. This paper asserts
that this differential converges on the obviousness,
and perceived legitimacy, of the condition at issue.14
Thus, "judicial indifference to gender expression" as
it is used in this paper, is shorthand for the perceived
illegitimacy of the physical and mental manifestations
of frustrated gender expression - a judicial
unwillingness to credit GID.
Furthermore, from a strategic standpoint,
because the medical model of gender proves mostly
ineffective in the framework for state-funding
requests, where medical diagnoses and expert
opinions apply directly to the issue being decided, the
medical model should not be expected to vindicate
the rights of gender-variant people in other areas of
the law, where the model applies only peripherally -
such as in Title VII discrimination claims.
This Note proceeds as follows: Part I
introduces the concepts of gender and gender
expression and seeks to clarify the important role that
one's physical presentation has in fully realizing one's
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intended gender identity. This Part draws heavily
from contemporary feminist theories on gender and
identity performance and the social construction of
gender identity.
Part II presents the medical perspective on
gender and follows the development of the medical
model from its nascence in the 1960s and 1970s to
its status as a legal fixture today. By providing the
history of the medical model, this Part attempts to
shed light on how and why the medical model came
to be entrenched in gender-based causes of action.
Part III presents in greater detail the
framework for state medical assistance claims by
gender-variant plaintiffs diagnosed with GID for
whom sex-reassignment surgery is prescribed as
medically necessary. This Part examines representative
case law under the three causes of action constituting
the framework: Eighth Amendment claims of
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need,
due process claims for denied Medicaid funding, and
income tax redetermination for medical expenses
deducted under I.R.C. § 213. Here, the analysis goes
into the structural differences built into each cause
of action, the disparate levels of implicit deference
applied in each action, and the logical inconsistencies
in the court opinions, all of which suggest judicial
indifference toward gender expression.
Part IV takes a broader view of the medical
model as it is applied in the state medical assistance
framework. This Part seeks to demonstrate that the
medical model propagates an overall gender stasis.
Part IV-A argues that the medical model leaves
gender expression in a social stasis because individuals
adopting the medical model for their legal claims
are forced to adopt an essentialist conception of
gender as well as conservative gender norms. Part
IV-B extrapolates from the limited legal efficacy of
the medical model as it applies to the state medical
assistance framework to suggest that the model should
not be expected to provide more robust support in
other areas of law. Part IV-C looks at the language used
in legal discussions of gender issues and determines
that using abstract medical concepts as placeholders
for more contentious issues of gender identity shelves
critical discussion of gender. Finally, Part IV-D argues
that, in the context of the state medical assistance
framework, the medical model denies gender-variant
people agency in determining the physical aspects of
their gender expression.
Part V examines the potential interaction
of the state medical assistance framework with Title
VII "unequal burdens" dress code jurisprudence. The
goal of this Part is to demonstrate how case law in
the limited setting of state medical assistance claims
connects with other areas of the law and ultimately
affects the gender-variant community in seemingly
unrelated areas.
Part VI concludes by noting that judicial
deference to administrative opinions in state medical
assistance claims has the inadvertent effect of eroding
the traditional male-female gender binary. This
is because gender reassignment surgery actually
reinforces the binary by moving individuals out of
the "gray area" between male and female and into one
category or the other. Thus, by denying gender-variant
people gender reassignment surgery, courts force them
to inhabit the space in between the traditional male
and female sex-gender alignment. This Note suggests
that gender-variant people work from this gray area to
create new tools for expressing gender.
I. Gender and Gender Identity
Traditional conceptualizations of sex and
gender merged the two concepts together, and
because sex was generally thought to be biologically
determined, so too was gender." Contemporary
feminist theory explains that sex and gender are two
distinct concepts, and that the fusion of sex and
gender is a socially constructed phenomenon. 6 The
basic idea is that generation upon generation has
assigned and enforced societal roles and condoned
behaviors based on a newborn's anatomical sex." The
passage of time and the reinforcement of these socially
prescribed roles eventually blurred the line between
anatomical sex and gender until people began to see
gender roles and behaviors as determined by sex,
rather than by society.'8
In her pioneering work on gender, Judith
Butler explains that gender is "the repeated stylization
of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly
rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to
produce the appearance of substance, a natural sort of
being."'" The idea is that gender is not some concrete,
immutable trait; rather, gender is performed and
interpreted in a particular way, and the interaction
of the performance and the interpretation makes
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up one's gender identity. As Butler puts it, "there is
no gender identity behind the expression of gender;
that identity is performatively constituted by the very
expressions that are said to be its results." 20
The physical body plays an "inescapable role"
in gender expression - it is the two-way filter through
which individuals experience the world and the world
interprets the individual. If every performative act
is read in the context of the physical body,22 then
individuals may choose to manipulate their bodies or
otherwise "develop practices that either permanently
or semi-permanently mark the body, providing a
stable basis for public recognition of their chosen
. . . identity."23 Such is often the case for gender-
variant people, who know "what [they are] and how
[they need] to look." 24 In order to achieve that look,
many gender-variant people seek hormone therapy,
cosmetic surgery for secondary sex characteristics, or
gender reassignment surgery.25
Most gender-variant people are unable
to access these treatments because of the costs
of the treatments, 6 and because of the medical,
administrative, and judicial barriers between the
individual and the desired treatment.27 This may seem
inconsequential if one views these physical alterations
as "cosmetic," but inaccessibility of treatment
acquires greater meaning when one understands how
important the physical body is to a gender-variant
person's identity. The medical field has recognized the
importance of the physical body to gender-variant
gender identities: first when it included the desire for
gender reassignment surgery as a necessary diagnostic
criteria for "transsexualism," 28 and later when it noted
the intense distress that a gender-variant person
experiences when that individual's physical body
challenges the individual's self-perceived gender.
II. The Medical Model of Gender:
Gender Identity Disorder
A. Definitions
Medical practitioners use the term Gender
Identity Disorder ("GID") to describe a feeling of
disjunction between one's biologically determined
anatomical sex and one's self-perceived gender.o
The APA first recognized the concept known today
as GID in the third edition of its Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual (DSM-IIl), published in 1980.31
The DSM-II labeled the condition "transsexualism"
and described it as a "Psychosexual Disorder"
characterized by at least two years of "a persistent
sense of discomfort and inappropriateness about one's
anatomic sex" and a "persistent wish to be rid of one's
genitals and to live as a member of the other sex. "32
The APA revised the manual in 1987 and reclassified
transsexualism in "Disorders Usually First Evidenced
in Infancy, Childhood, or Adolescence."33
The next conceptual revision to transsexualism
came in 1994 with the fourth edition of the manual
(DSM-IV), which renamed the condition "Gender
Identity Disorder" and again reclassified the condition,
this time as a treatable psychological disorder.3 The
only significant diagnostic difference between the third
and fourth editions is that the latter requires "evidence
of clinically significant distress or impairment in
social, occupational, or other important areas of
functioning."35 Clinically significant distress was not
required under the third edition.
In 2013, the American Psychiatric Association
(APA) will release the fifth edition of its Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual (DSM- ).36 Among the noteworthy
changes proposed to take effect in the new edition is
the continued evolution of the terminology used to
refer to members of the gender-variant community.
In the fifth edition, the APA intends to replace the
most recent terminology with "gender incongruence,"
a term that "better reflects the core problem: an
incongruence between, on the one hand, what identity
one experiences and/or expresses and, on the other
hand, how one is expected to live based on one's
assigned gender."37 In support of the new terminology,
the APA reports that many members of the gender-
variant community reject GID as stigmatizing."
B. Diagnosis and Treatment
The first step in diagnosing GID involves
applying various diagnostic criteria. The Standards
of Care compiled by the World Professional
Association for Transgender Health (WPATH)
endorse the criteria used in both the DSM-I V and
the International Classification of Diseases, both of
which employ essentially the same criteria." After
the preliminary diagnosis, more specified diagnostic
procedures are paired with the treatment process. 40
Many individuals who seek a GID diagnosis do so in
order to eventually get gender reassignment surgery.4 1
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However, because gender reassignment surgery has
serious consequences, and because the important
determinative information is mostly subjective, self-
reported information from the patient, the diagnostic
process is long and thorough.42
As GID evolved from a disease to a disorder,
practitioners reconceptualized treatment regimens
for individuals seeking medical assistance. The first
treatments, studied in the 196 0s, attempted to alter
the patient's self-perception to match the patient's
anatomical sex, but these purely therapeutic methods
were deemed ineffective.43 Subsequent studies
suggested that a combination of psychotherapy,
hormone treatment, and gender reassignment surgery
would effectively treat gender identity disorder.
Today, medical professionals widely accept this
"triadic" approach to treatment and WPATH's
Standards of Care endorse the triadic approach as
well." The Standards of Care emphasize that the goal
of treatment is not to "cure" the patient, but to assist
in the transition process. 6 The methods endorsed by
the Standards of Care are supported by peer-reviewed
research and years of successful results, and WPATH
asserts that the triadic approach is the only proven
treatment for severe GID."
Though studies indicate that the triadic
approach effectively treats GID, without insurance,
the costs of treating GID are prohibitively expensive.
Genital reassignment surgery for transgender men
can cost up to $100,000, while the procedure for
transgender women can range from $7,000 to
$50,000." The cost of hormone therapy is about
$2,000 per year." The WPATH Standards of Care
recommends a year of hormone therapy before
gender reassignment; it also provides that extended
hormone therapy may be sufficient for individuals
who do not wish to undergo surgery. 0 In the latter
case, an individual with GID may be required to pay
$2,000 each year for several decades."
III. The Existing Framework for State-Funded
Medical Assistance: State-Funded Gender-
Reassignment Surgery
Prison inmates, individuals who qualify
as "categorically needy" under a state's Medicaid
statute,5 2 and non-incarcerated, non-categorically
needy taxpayers can appeal to the state for
assistance in funding medical procedures.53 Prison
inmates look primarily to prison officials to provide
treatment, but when none is provided, inmates may
allege deliberate indifference to medical necessity
under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment.5 4 Categorically
needy individuals may have medical procedures
funded by the state Medicaid program so long
as the condition fits within the state's Medicaid
statute." When Medicaid administrators deny a
Medicaid recipient funding, the recipient may
bring a due process claim alleging that the funding
request was improperly denied.16 Finally, non-
incarcerated, non-categorically needy individuals
who can afford to front the cost of an operation
can receive state funding by way of tax deductions
for medical procedures so long as the deductions
qualify under I.R.C. § 213.1' Each of these causes of
action involves a different burden of proof, and as
the following sections explain, each cause of action
also receives a different level of implicit judicial
deference to the relevant administrative authorities.
A. Eighth Amendment Claims ofDeliberate
Indifference
Society does not expect prisoners to have
unlimited access to healthcare." Thus, a prisoner
faces a considerable burden in stating that denying the
prisoner access to medical treatment constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. A
plaintiff who contends that he or she was subjected
to cruel and unusual punishment must satisfy both
an objective and a subjective element: the prisoner
must prove that he or she had an objectively "serious
medical need," and that those responsible for the
prisoners care were subjectively "deliberate[1y]
indifferen[t]" to those needs."
An inmate can satisfy the objective burden
of demonstrating a serious medical need by obtaining
a medical diagnosis,60 or, in cases where the medical
need is "'so obvious that even a layperson would easily
recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention,"' the
inmate can satisfy this burden without a medical
diagnosis.' Examples of cases in which a plaintiff
has demonstrated a serious medical need without
a diagnosis involve major wounds left open and
untreated,62 or inmate deaths from illness.
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The subjective element - deliberate
indifference - is proven by showing that those
responsible for the prisoner's care "(1) had subjective
knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregarded
that risk; and (3) exhibited conduct that [was] more
than gross negligence."64 Case law interpretations of
this subjective requirement demonstrate an almost
insurmountable amount of deference to the decisions
of prison officials. For example, courts have stated
that the medical care provided to an inmate need not
"even [be] very good,"6 so long as prison officials
provide some form of treatment deemed adequate
by a physician. 6 Other courts have stated that "[m]
edical treatment violates the Eighth Amendment
only when it is so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or
excessive as to shock the conscience or be intolerable
to fundamental fairness."67
1. Kosilek v. Maloney"
During the more than ten years that Kosilek
had been incarcerated, she had been visited by at least
four doctors, and all diagnosed her with severe GID
requiring treatment.6 9 Kosilek never received "any
real treatment" during this time period, however,70
and her untreated GID had "prompted h[er] to
attempt suicide twice while incarcerated, and to try
to castrate [her]self as well."7 Kosilek filed an Eighth
Amendment claim against the Commissioner of
the Department of Corrections ("DOC"), alleging
deliberate indifference to her serious medical need.72
In response to the Kosilek's Eighth Amend-
ment complaint, the Commissioner implemented
a blanket "freeze-frame" policy for all transsexual
prisoners in the DOC's custody.73 The policy
provided inmates with the same gender identity-
related treatment they received prior to incarceration
throughout the course of their incarceration. Because
gender reassignment surgery is considered new
treatment, even if the need for it has been diagnosed,
this policy had the effect of categorically prohibiting
GRS for inmates. In Kosilek's case, the policy served
to prevent doctors from exercising discretion in
prescribing treatments.74 At the time the policy was
enacted, Kosilek's medical expert and at least three
doctors for the DOC agreed that "the likelihood [wa]
s exceedingly close to one hundred percent that she
w[ould] kill herself" if she did not receive medical
treatment.75 When the Commissioner enacted the
policy, he was aware that the plaintiff had tried to
commit suicide and castrate herself.76 He was also
aware that at least one doctor thought there was
a high risk that the inmate would commit suicide,
and he knew that GID could pose serious risks if
untreated. Even so, the Commissioner continued to
deny Kosilek treatment.7 1
The District Court of Massachusetts found
that the inmate easily met her objective burden of
demonstrating a serious medical need.79 Turning
to the subjective prong, the court required Kosilek
to show that her GID was not adequately treated
"([1]) because of [the Commissioner's] deliberate
indifference; and ([2]) that [that] deliberate
indifference is likely to continue in the future."80
The court concluded that the Commissioner "knew
many facts from which it could have been inferred
that [the plaintiff] was at substantial risk of serious
harm if he [sic] did not receive adequate treatment,
but the court relieved the Commissioner of Eighth
Amendment liability because he "did not, however,
actually draw that inference.""1 The plaintiff's Eighth
Amendment claim failed, but the court suggested
that the Commissioner provide the plaintiff with
psychotherapy "[a]t a minimum. "82
B. State Medicaid Funding and Medically
Necessary Treatments
Medicaid is a federal-state cooperative
program through which the federal government
provides for the medical care of needy individuals
by distributing funds to the states, which serve as
administrators of the funds.83 Before a state can
receive medical funding, the state must submit, for
approval, a plan detailing "reasonable standards"
for determining the disbursement of funds." Those
reasonable standards prohibit states from denying or
reducing the coverage of an individual "solely because
of the diagnosis, type of illness, or condition." Even
so, states have discretion to limit coverage based
on "medical necessity" and "utilization control
procedures," so long as those limits are "reasonable"
and "consistent with the objectives of the Act.""
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, several
courts invalidated Medicaid statute that excluded
gender reassignment surgery, citing expert
testimony that the surgery was the only available
treatment for "transsexualism."8 6 Ironically, as
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the scientific community worked to improve the
medical understanding and treatment of gender-
related disorders, the coverage of the procedures
that gender-variant Medicaid recipients wanted
became more difficult to access.17 The change was
not due to increased efforts or new arguments from
the Medicaid administrators; rather, the defendant-
administrators still proffered the same arguments
that courts rejected decades earlier." But where the
administrators' arguments once failed because gender
reassignment surgery was thought to be the only
known treatment for "transsexualism," courts began
to defer to the defendant-Medicaid administrators'
judgments as to whether gender reassignment surgery
really is necessary."o
The change in the judicial treatment of state
decisions to cease funding of gender reassignment
surgery is most clearly demonstrated by two cases
in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. In Pinneke
v. Preisser,9' the court held that excluding gender
reassignment surgery was arbitrary, in violation of
the Medicaid Act; twenty years later, in Smith v.
Rasmussen,92 the same court heard the same facts, but
this time the court upheld a categorical exclusion of
gender reassignment surgeries.
1. Pinneke
In Pinneke, a Medicaid claimant who was
diagnosed with transsexualism" after "extensive
testing" challenged a policy in Iowa's state plan that
categorically denied Medicaid benefits for gender
reassignment surgery.94  The exclusion created
"an irrebuttable presumption that treatment of
transsexualism by alternation of healthy tissue cannot
be considered 'medically necessary.' 95
The Minnesota Supreme Court had
previously ruled on this issue in Doe v. Department
of Public Welfare.9' That court accepted as "given
. . . fact" that transsexualism establishes "roots" in
childhood and can be treated only by a "radical sex
conversion surgical procedure."" The Minnesota
Supreme Court lamented the necessity of the surgical
route, but concluded that surgery was "second-best
to a method of preventing these tragic reversals of
gender identity and role . . . .""
The Pinneke court cited the Doe opinion with
approval and, after reviewing the available medical
resources, concluded that "radical sex conversion
surgery is the only medical treatment available to
relieve or solve the problems of a true transsexual [,]""
and enjoined the state from prohibiting the "medically
necessary procedure.o Pinneke represented an
important legal victory for gender-variant people.
Many courts within the Eighth Circuit subsequently
cited Pinneke for the proposition that "[it] is contrary
to the objectives of Medicaid [to exclude] the 'only
available treatment known at this stage of the art for a
particular condition." 01
2. Smith v. Rasmussen102
Twenty years after Pinneke, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals was presented with the same issue:
an individual diagnosed with GID challenged an Iowa
Medicaid statute that prohibited "plastic surgery for
certain purposes and . . . specifically exclude[d] sex
reassignment surgery."'0o Though it appeared that
Rasmussen called for a direct application of the Pinneke
precedent, the Circuit Court stated that Pinnekewas "not
outcome determinative," in part because the legislature
in Pinneke "had not followed a formal rulemaking
process, had not consulted medical professionals, and
had disregarded the current accumulated knowledge of
the medical community."o104
Iowa's Medicaid amendment at issue in
Rasmussen excluded all " [p] rocedures related to gender
identity disorder."o' The state supported the exclusion
with the findings of a panel of physicians, none of
whom had experience or expertise relevant to GID,
that had been asked to review the efficacy of gender
reassignment surgery. 0 6 The district court determined
that the GID exclusion was unreasonable because
the state "failed to contact, as sources of pertinent
information, or to involve, as decision-makers or
advisors, any persons with actual experience in the
treatment of gender identity disorder."' 7 The Eighth
Circuit, reviewing the issue de novo,108 acknowledged
that "it might have been helpful or prudent for
the [s]tate to have sought opinions from medical
professionals with experience in [treating] gender
identity disorder," but affirmed the exclusion because
it "involved professional medical judgment."09
Strangely, while the Eighth Circuit upheld
the panel of physician's "professional medical
judgment," even after acknowledging that none of
the experts involved had "actual experience,"1 0 the
court also sustained the trial court's ruling excluding
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the defendant's medical expert's testimony because
the doctor "had examined only one patient with
gender identity disorder, that examination occurring
some eight years prior to trial." After reviewing the
issue, the court concluded that there was "no abuse
of discretion in the limitation of the testimony of
witnesses who, although considered experts in certain
areas, were not well-versed in the particular discipline
relevant to their testimony."'"
C The Internal Revenue Code and Deductions
for Medical Expenditures
The Internal Revenue Code allows a taxpayer
to deduct expenses for medical care from the taxpayer's
gross taxable income." 2 "Medical care" expenses,
as defined by I.R.C. § 213, are those expenses paid
toward "the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or
prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting
any structure or function of the body.""l 3 The statute
excludes cosmetic surgery, which is defined as "any
procedure [that] is directed at improving the patient's
appearance and does not meaningfully promote
the proper function of the body or prevent or treat
illness or disease.""' The cosmetic surgery exclusion
applies "unless the surgery is necessary to ameliorate
a deformity arising from, or directly related to, a
congenital abnormality, a personal injury resulting
from an accident or trauma, or disfiguring disease.""'
Under the cosmetic surgery exclusion,
the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals disallowed a
deduction for a woman requesting breast enhancement
surgery in order to make her abnormally small right
breast the size of her larger left breast, but allowed
the deduction for the same woman for a procedure
to decrease the size of her abnormally large left breast
to the size of her smaller right breast."' The court
reasoned that the disallowed surgery was cosmetic
because it did not improve bodily functions, whereas
the allowed surgery "would probably" improve overall
bodily function.'' 7
1. O'Donnabhain v. CI.R.18
O'Donnabhain was a case of first impression
in the United States Tax Court.' At issue was whether
a transgender woman could deduct her gender-
reassignment and breast-augmentation surgeries from
her income tax returns pursuant to I.R.C. § 213.120
O'Donnabhain, the plaintiff-taxpayer, was diagnosed
with GID by a "licensed independent social worker"
who prescribed a treatment plan that followed the
WPATH Standards of Care.12' After completing
hormone therapy and the "real-life experience,"
O'Donnabhain obtained the two medical procedures
in order to align her physical appearance with her
female gender identity.122 The Commissioner of
the IRS claimed that the surgeries were "cosmetic
. . . because they were [aimed] at improving
[O'Donnabhain's] appearance and did not treat an
illness or disease, meaningfully promote the proper
function of the body, or ameliorate a deformity. "123
The court, noting that no relevant legal
precedent spoke to the issue of what qualifies as
"cosmetic" under § 213, formulated the following test:
a surgical procedure is not cosmetic if it treats disease.124
In order to satisfy this test, O'Donnabhain had to show
that GID was a disease and that gender reassignment
and breast reduction surgeries treat GID;I25 she did
not need to prove that the procedure was "medically
necessary." 26 Influenced by plaintiff's and defendant's
medical experts - all of which agreed that untreated
GID could result in autocastration, autopenectomy, or
suicidel27 _ the court concluded that the severity of
the condition, combined with the inclusion of GID in
all the authoritative medical texts, indicated that GID
was a disease for the purposes of § 213.128
Turning to whether O'Donnabhain's
surgeries treated GID, her expert testified that gender
reassignment surgery was the only effective medical
treatment for severe GID.129 Though the government's
experts argued that no such consensus existed within
the larger medical community, the court allowed
the deduction for the gender reassignment surgery
and held that a consensus was not necessary if the
"circumstances 'justify a reasonable belief [that]
the treatment would work.""l3 0 However, the court
denied deductions for breast augmentation surgery,
calling the surgery a cosmetic expense because it
"C merely improved" the patient's appearance and did
not treat her GID.13'
D. Disparate Treatment in the Framework for
State-Funded Medical Assistance
1. Disparate Treatment Due to Structural
Differences
The obvious disparity between the burdens
that must be met in order to receive state funding
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under each cause of action was at least partially
intended by the institutions that created each cause
of action. The Eighth Amendment, for example,
originally considered only whether certain types
of punishment were cruel and unusual.132 Judicial
activism expanded the Eighth Amendment's scope to
grant inmates a right to healthcare, and later decisions
articulated the two-prong "deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need" test.133 But inmates rarely satisfy
the subjective prong of the deliberate indifference
test, 134 so the fact that the subjective prong is judicially
created and applied suggests that courts have interpreted
the Supreme Court's rulings narrowly, as intending to
withhold treatment in most cases.
Similarly, the United States Congress created
the Medicaid program and conferred discretion on
state legislatures to implement the program as they
saw fit, so long as the state provides coverage for all
"medically necessary" procedures, 135 and does not
exclude procedures "on the basis of the diagnoses
or conditions they are designed to treat."136 States
can, however, remain within these guidelines while
also determining for themselves what constitutes
"medically necessary" care, provided that that
determination has a rational basis. 13 7 For instance, a
state may limit the number of days that a categorically
needy individual may receive subsidized in-patient
care, based rationally on the limited funds of the state
and the general needs of the population.138
The United States Congress also created
the avenue for deducting medical expenses from
taxable income.' I.R.C. § 213 extends to almost
any non-cosmetic medical treatment and even covers
some cosmetic procedures. 140 The statute allows the
IRS Commissioner to determine which deductions
are appropriate on a preliminary basis, but unlike
the Medicaid statute, § 213 does not confer broad
discretion on the Commissioner to formulate a
scheme within those general guidelines.14 1
These structural differences in the causes
of action for state medical funding split along
socioeconomic lines. If this framework was created in a
single legislative action that assigned different burdens
based on socioeconomic status, it would suggest that
Congress felt access to state healthcare assistance
should be based on a social hierarchy. Though the
framework actually consists of three independent
causes of action, intuitively, the effect is nearly the
same because each cause of action was created
with the affected social group in mind. Medicaid's
"medically necessary" standard, for instance, indicates
that people on welfare should receive only basic
health services that others deem worthy of allocated
funds. Likewise, the judicial creation and application
of the Eighth Amendment's "deliberate indifference"
standard suggests that prisoners should not be
granted medical care unless their supervisors know
they could die without it. Meanwhile, § 213 provides
non-incarcerated, non-categorically needy taxpayers
with a tax deduction which, mathematically, is the
same as providing the individual with a government
subsidy equal to the product of the individual's tax
rate and the cost of the operation - with relative
ease, suggesting that the government does not oppose
such procedures for individuals who can pay for the
initial cost of care. 142
2. Disparate Treatment Due to
Inconsistent Judicial Deference
In addition to the structural disadvantages
faced by prisoners and individuals on welfare, the
amount of deference the court affords the opinions
of the defendant's medical experts in state medical
assistance cases seems an implicit stop-gap for Eighth
Amendment and Medicaid due process claims. In
Barnhill v. Cheery, an inmate's Eighth Amendment
claim failed when prison officials provided expert
testimony that merely challenged the testimony of
the plaintiff's medical expert.14' The court did not
question the wisdom of the medical diagnoses and
treatment plans proffered by the doctors on the prison
staff; rather, despite the obvious biases of the prison's
medical staff, the court accepted each concurring
opinion as fact.' In Kosilek, the court noted that the
DOC Commissioner replaced the opinions of DOC
doctors with his own opinion, but, paradoxically, the
court did not hold the Commissioner accountable
for his erroneous judgments because he was not a
medical doctor."'
The Rasmussen court was similarly deferential
when the court accepted the judgment of a panel of
non-expert medical practitioners who determined
that not all doctors felt gender reassignment surgery
was effective in treating GID.1 6 Though medical
consensus was never part of the "medically necessary"
determination before, the Rasmussen court felt that
the lack of consensus provided reasonable ground for
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a categorical ban on gender reassignment surgery.147
This deference is more confusing in light of the court's
recognition that the testimony from the defendant's
expert was properly excluded because the expert was
"not well-versed in the particular discipline relevant
to [the expert's] testimony. "148
If the plaintiff in Rasmussen had had greater
financial means, she could have paid for her own gender
reassignment surgery and deducted it from her taxes
- which is the financial equivalent of a government-
subsidy'4 1 - without having to worry about a medical
consensus. Such was the case in O'Donnabhain, in
which the court essentially disregarded testimony
from the defendant-IRS Commissioner's medical
experts and held that a consensus was not required so
long as the "circumstances justify a reasonable belief"
that gender reassignment surgery treats GID.'o
3. Disparate Treatment Due to the
Condition Involved
Comparing case law for GID to case law
for other conditions under the same causes of action
reveals even more judicial inconsistency. Under the
Eighth Amendment, for instance, a prison official
is deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need
if she "knows of [but] disregards an excessive risk to
inmate health or safety . . . ."'I' This requires that the
prison official "'both be aware of facts from which
the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk
of serious harm exists, and she must also draw the
inference." 152 In Kosilek, the court held that the
Commissioner of the DOC was not deliberately
indifferent to the plaintiff's medical needs, despite
his awareness that the plaintiff had twice attempted
suicide because she had not received treatment,
because the Commissioner "had not actually
inferred" that the plaintiff presented a substantial risk
if untreated,"' and because the Commissioner was
"not qualified to make medical judgments."154
At the time the district court decided
Kosilek, Eighth Amendment precedent in that circuit
suggested a less deferential standard. The First Circuit
Court of Appeals had held a prison guard accountable
as deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's safety when
an inmate was assaulted by another inmate after the
first inmate was led out of his holding cell. '5 The
prisoner was on "cell feed" status, which meant he
received meals in his cell, instead of with the general
prison population.15 'The prison guard knew that "cell
feed" status indicated that the prisoner either "had a
health problem or . . . was in protective custody."1 7
The First Circuit held that such knowledge was
sufficient to "support[] the inference that [the guard]
was aware of a high probability that [the prisoner] was
vulnerable to attack" and thus deliberately indifferent
to the inmate's safety.158 That "high probability" that
the court referred to was fifty percent - that is,
the prisoner either had a health problem or was in
protective custody."'
The threshold applied by the First Circuit
in the assault case is far less deferential to prison
authorities than the threshold applied by the district
court in Kosilek. The First Circuit held that knowledge
of a fifty percent chance ofa risk was sufficient to hold
a guard accountable as knowing the risk was present;
the district court held that the Commissioner's
knowledge that GID poses risks if untreated, that
the inmate had previously attempted suicide and
autocastration, and that at least one medical expert
felt there was a high risk that the inmate would
attempt suicide again if untreated all were insufficient
to hold the Commissioner accountable as if he had
actually inferred that a risk was present.160
The obvious difference between the prison
assault case and Kosilek is the underlying cause of
the risk: assault in the former; GID in the latter. The
disparate burdens in the two cases suggest that the
court sees the risks associated with GID as less clearly
necessitating protection. This is indicated further by
the Kosilek court's use of a rhetorical technique that
subtly relieved the court of its decision-making role,
while still appearing to empathize with the plaintiff's
situation: the court points out that "[t]he DOC's
policy concerning gender identity disorders differs
from its policy concerning other serious illnesses
. . [I]f an inmate were depressed because he had
cancer, the DOC would . . . attempt to cure, or at
least diminish, the cancer by providing care that
would be regarded as adequate in the community."16
Here, and elsewhere throughout the opinion, the court
recommends that the inmate receive treatment but fails
to acknowledge its own role in providing that treatment.
Medicaid jurisprudence raises similar
questions. In Rasmussen, the court's decision to exclude
the expert's testimony because he had treated only one
GID patient makes little sense given that the court
ultimately upheld a Medicaid exclusion supported
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by physicians who, together, had less experience than
the defendant's expert. In this context, the court's
acknowledgment that the panel of experts did not
include anyone "with experience in treating gender
identity disorder," trivializes the importance of gender
expression to gender-variant individuals. And again,
it appears that the court treats GID in a way that
it would not treat other conditions. Employing the
same sort of thought experiment used by the Kosilek
court,16 it seems unlikely that the Rasmussen court
would have been as deferential to medical opinion if
a team of podiatrists and OB-GYNs determined that
there was no medical consensus as to the effectiveness
of mastectomies in treating breast cancer. But for
GID, the court readily accepted the opinions of
inexperienced medical professionals.
1V. Gender Stasis: The Consequences of
Medical Model
In broad terms, requests for state funding
that are based on the medical model of gender
follow a path to a predictable result with serious
consequences: the individual adopts the medical
model along with its essentialist conceptualization of
gender and its conservative gender norms; the medical
model provides inadequate support for the medical
assistance request and the legal claim fails; the parties
involved discuss the plaintiff's complex and personal
expression as a medical abstraction, and thus fail to
recognize that the case involves the larger issue of the
plaintiff's gender identity; and, at the end of it all, the
plaintiff does not receive medical treatment, is unable
to manipulate his or her body to realize his or her
desired gender identity, and continues to be read in
the context of her congenital body parts. This process
ultimately has the effect of freezing gender expression
in a social, legal, conceptual, and physical stasis.
A. Social Stasis: The Medical Modelfom the
Patient's Perspective
In addition to the institutionalized
discrimination based on socioeconomic class and the
underlying condition that this framework reveals, the
framework also has serious implications when one
considers the experience of a gender-variant person
moving through the healthcare system. After all, losing
the legal battle is only the last step in a long process
that typically spans several years. 163 In order to make it
to trial and have a judge rule on the merits of the case,
the gender-variant individual must have a qualified
medical professional prescribe gender reassignment
surgery as medically necessary.'"( Even before a medical
professional will prescribe such treatment, however, the
individual must be diagnosed with GID and, in most
cases, the individual must complete psychotherapy
and the "real life experience" of assuming the desired
gender role.' These preliminary treatments usually
last several months to a year.'66
1. Adopting the Medical Model; Adopting
Essentialism
Obtaining the GID diagnosis proves difficult
for many gender-variant individuals because it
requires adopting the rigid, category-based medical
model of gender. In order to fulfill the necessary
diagnostic criteria, individuals seeking a GID
diagnosis often recite a standard narrative detailing
a gender-confused childhood, crushes on children of
the same anatomical sex, and a persistent feeling of
being a man (or woman) "trapped" in the body of a
woman (or man).67 For several decades, researchers
have recognized that patients incorporate the key
elements of case studies into their own diagnostic
interviews, and that those patients who most
successfully appropriate the gender-variant rhetoric
"win operations."168
Writing about his own experience trying
to obtain a GID diagnosis, Dean Spade recalls that
medical practitioners at the Los Angeles Free Clinic
wanted him to explain that, for all of his life, he
had been conscious of his status as an outsider
with respect to his gender. 6 ' But for people like
Dean Spade, who "reject the narrative of a troubled
childhood," appropriating the false narrative often
comes at the cost of betraying one's self-concept and
one's conception of gender.170 Spade grappled with
the price of a GID diagnosis before he eventually saw
a doctor. As Spade recounts, the diagnostic process
required that he denounce his long-held views of
gender and adopt "a binary gender system that [he]
had been working to dismantle since adolescence."' 7 1
This standard narrative resembles the long-
antiquated code pleading requirements under which
the plaintiff in a legal action had to fit his legal claim
into a prescribed form of action, no matter how odd
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the fit, in order to be heard.'72 Here, the patient
seeking medical treatment must fit his or her past into
a pre-formulated narrative in order to obtain a GID
diagnosis. The form-pleading-style GID diagnosis
not only forces patients to rewrite their pasts with
a "tranny childhood lens,""' it also contributes to
a unitary, essentialist conceptualization of gender-
variant people as homogenous and composed of
"inherent" characteristics. 7 As the anti-essentialist
critique points out, what the medical model and
its standard narrative assert as "knowledge, truth,
objectivity, and reason are actually merely the effects
of a particular form of social power.""' That is, the
essentialist medical conceptualization of GID as
displaying the same set of characteristics in any given
case is a product of those institutions and individuals
that control access to a GID diagnosis and gender
reassignment surgery.
2. Adopting the Medical Model; Adopting
Conservative Gender Norms
An additional problem with the standard
GID narrative is that it is rooted in, and reinforces,
conservative gender norms. Transfeminine people
must reveal a childhood desire to play with dolls, and
transmasculine women have to recall being tomboyish
girls;'7 1 transfeminine people who identify as butch-
lesbian women might appear too aggressive to warrant
a diagnosis, and transmasculine people who identify as
effeminate gay men might not be aggressive enough."'
The same gender norms persist post-treatment;
support groups provide "passing tips," which generally
recommend that people transitioning from male-to-
female avoid short haircuts and that those transitioning
from female-to-male wear khaki pants.77 Reports
from the 1970s indicate that clinicians encouraged
patients approved for gender-reassignment to enter
heterosexual relationships after surgery and to work in
a gender-appropriate profession.' 9
Dress and grooming tips and
recommendations for the patient's post-operative
social life posit the ability to "pass" as an "authentic"
member of the patient's post-operative sex as the
ultimate goal of the whole process. "0 Indeed, follow-
up studies on post-operative gender-variant people
use the patient's ability to conform to gender norms
as an indicator of the procedure's success.' 8 '
However, it seems counterintuitive that
an individual who "suffer[ed] clinically significant
distress"" in social situations - as required for a GID
diagnosis - would seek out gender reassignment for
the sole purpose ofreaffirming the same social strictures
that caused the individual's preoperative distress. Here
it is difficult to separate cause and effect: does the
post-operative gender-variant person aspire to "pass"
in order to fully realize sex-gender alignment, or is
that desire a product of years of required participation
in the medical model's conservative norms leading up
to gender reassignment?
B. Legal Stasis: The Medical Model Inadequately
Supports Gender-Related Legal Claims
The framework of requests for state medical
funding demonstrates that the medical model is an
ineffective tool for sustaining gender-related legal
actions. In this framework, the support that the medical
model provides directly lines up with the objective of
the legal action; that is, the plaintiff has a diagnosis
from a medical expert who says treatment is medically
necessary, and the plaintiff wants only to receive that
prescribed medical treatment.' Though this would
seem like a cut-and-dried matter that is easily resolved
by reference to authoritative medical texts, as discussed
above, courts find ways to discredit the plaintiff's
participation in the medical model by deferring to the
judgment of prison officials and medical advisors.'8 4
Other causes of action in other areas of law
are mostly beyond the scope of this Note, but it
seems logically unsound to expect the medical model
to provide more robust support in areas of the law
that rely on the model more peripherally. In equal
protection claims, for instance, wherein gender-
variant plaintiffs argue that gender-variant people
should be a protected class, a medical diagnosis that
cannot convince courts to expand a state's Medicaid
provision can hardly be expected to convince courts
to expand the coverage of a constitutional provision.
C Conceptual Stasis: Medical Rhetoric Shelves
Critical Discussions of Gender
Once the medical model became entrenched
in the legal system, medical definitions and terminology
became the language of discourse on gender issues.' 5
This has had the effect of retarding critical discussion
of gender because the medical language employed
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in contentious legal issues is both imprecise and
superficial. For instance, in both ODonnabhain and
the Medicaid line of cases, the plaintiff argued that
gender reassignment surgery was "medically necessary,"
but the defendant countered that the surgery was
"cosmetic.""' In common usage, as well as in medical
parlance, these evaluative terms are on opposite ends
of the spectrum, the former being essential to the
plaintiff's health, and the latter being a luxury. Despite
the distance separating these terms, however, courts
have not been able to decide, once and for all, that
gender reassignment surgery is one or the other."'
Additionally, in some instances, medical
terms become placeholders for more charged issues of
gender and identity. While this eases communication
about complicated - and sometimes theoretical -
ideas on gender, it also detaches what is at issue from
what is at stake: the ability to fully express one's gender.
In Rasmussen, for example, GID assumes the role of
an abstract medical condition for which a particular
treatment either is or is not medically necessary.
Similarly, in O'Donnabhain, the defendant's medical
experts tried to define "disease" in such a way that
it would exclude GID.'" In both of these cases, the
defendants attempted to use academic distinctions to
undermine the imprecise medical language on which
the diagnosis and treatment of GID are built. At that
point the case becomes sophistical and is no longer
about one's ability to align his or her body with his or
her self-perceived gender.
D. Physical Stasis: The Medical Model Denies
Gender- Variant People Agency
1. Gatekeepers"'
The gatekeepers are those individuals who
stand in between the gender-variant person who
requires state funding for medical care and the
requested treatment."o In every case within this
framework, the plaintiffs had to first pass the medical
test by convincing a medical professional to diagnose
GID."' The second stage in every case required that
the individual appeal to administrators: the inmate
had to exhaust all available remedies within the
prison system,' 92 the categorically needy individual
had to submit a request for funding to Medicaid
administrators,193 and the non-incarcerated, non-
categorically needy individual had to submit her
medical deduction to the IRS for the commissioner
to approve or disapprove."' As previously discussed,
the administrators denied funding in every case."5
Next, a court reviews the administrators'
judgment. The judiciary should not actually represent
an additional hurdle beyond the administrators; rather,
the court system should be an impartial, but more
costly and time-consuming avenue to vindicate the
individual's statutory or constitutional rights. Whether
a court vindicates those rights, however, often depends
on the cause of action, and even when the court
holds in the plaintiff's favor, the legislature, the most
obdurate gatekeeper of all, can pass or amend a law to
explicitly exclude funding in future appeals." 6
The majority of individuals who seek gender
reassignment surgery do not receive treatment. One
study estimated that 10,000 people try to obtain
gender reassignment surgery each year, but only 1%-
3% of them actually get surgery." 7 Financially able
individuals can pay for surgery out of pocket and, if
they do not have insurance, they can deduct the cost of
the surgery from their taxable income."' Individuals
that do not have the financial resources to pay for the
surgery themselves have little legal recourse.'9
Yet, for gender-variant people who know
"what [they are] and how that needs to look,"2 00
body manipulations that change what their physical
form means in social and cultural contexts remain a
critical formative aspect of their identities.20' Thus,
the gatekeepers deny gender-variant people agency in
realizing their desired gender expression by denying
them the means to shape their bodies: without state
funding, the medical procedures or hormones that
will align the individuals' physical and gendered
selves are out of reach.202
2. Diagnosis Fuels Demand
Some scholars argue that the medical model
exacerbates the distress that characterizes GID, and
fuels demand for gender reassignment surgery.203 This
argument begins with the premise that the disjunction
between anatomical sex and gender that underlies GID
predates any medical recognition of the condition. 20 4
Before the medical model, some individuals with
cross-gender identities probably wanted to alter their
bodies or dress in a way that aligned their anatomical
sex with their self-perceived gender.205 As gender
became fused with sex, however, gender expression
THE MODERN AM ElRCAN52
was frustrated because such individuals became
deviants who were seen as breaking social norms - a
distressful characterization.206
This desire to express one's gender and the
distress associated with having that desire denied,
however, intensified when sexologists identified
the concept of transsexualism, and later when the
DSM-III formally recognized transsexualism.20 7 The
classification affected individuals with a cross-gender
identification on multiple levels. First, the label
told gender-variant people that medical researchers
considered the sex-gender disjunction to be significant
enough to be the basis of a classification, and the
classification was that of an "other": the label was
unambiguous about distinguishing gender-variant
people as a discrete "out" group, different from the
social majority.20 Secondly, gender-variant people,
whether or not previously cognizant of their sex-
gender disjunction, adopted the term "transsexual"
for its power to explain their ambiguities. 209 For many,
adopting the transsexual label had the consequence of
altering their self-perception because the subtext of
the medical diagnosis is that gender-variant people
are different in specific ways. 210 Furthermore, by
including a desire for gender reassignment surgery in
the diagnosis, the transsexual label posited the surgical
procedure as both something every gender-variant
person inherently desires and as something with the
ability to "cure" transsexualism. In other words, the
diagnosis implies that the preoperative gender-variant
body requires a cure, an idea that causes gender-
variant people to "hate their bodies." 2 11
The idea that gender-variant people want to
alter their physical bodies because they have a GID
diagnosis denies agency in a different way than do
the gatekeepers. Attributing the desire to manipulate
one's body to the GID diagnosis effectively imputes
to the medical model an unrealistic explanatory power
because it reverses the causal relationship. Gender-variant
people want to alter their bodies in order to realize a
specific social and cultural meaning; the medical model
places the label on that desire after the fact.
V. Implications for Title VII's "Unequal
Burdens" Standard
One of the practical consequences of the
inability of most gender-variant people to access
state medical funds - and therefore treatment - is
that they remain in their anatomically sexed bodies,
but may continue to identify with a gender that is
not traditionally aligned with that anatomical sex.
This has the potential to implicate Title VII, which
prohibits discrimination "because of . . . sex,"212
and based on gender stereotyping,213 but not always
because of gender expression.214
A. Employee Dress Codes: Jesperson v. Harrah's
Operating Co.21 1
The state medical funding framework could
have interesting consequence as it relates to Title
VII's "equal burdens" standard of employer dress
codes. According to the "unequal burdens" test, a sex-
differentiated dress code constitutes sex discrimination
prohibited under Title VII if it "imposes unequal
burdens on men and women." 216 This requires
weighing the cost and time necessary for employees
of each sex to comply with the policy. 217 Still, the
dress code may be upheld if a bona fide occupational
qualification justifies the disparate treatment.218
The "equal burdens" standard for sex-
based dress codes was applied in Jesperson v. Harrah's
Operating Co.,219 in which a casino dress code required
that female drink-servers wear stockings and makeup,
with their hair "teased, curled, or styled." 220 The same
dress code prohibited males from wearing makeup or
their hair below their collars.22' The dress code also
required a general "well groomed" appearance of
both male and female drink servers.222 The plaintiff,
a female drink-server, refused to accept the makeup
requirement because makeup made her feel "'dolled
up,' like a sexual object."223 The plaintiff alleged that
the dress code's makeup requirement constituted sex
discrimination prohibited by Title VII.224
The Ninth Circuit applied the "unequal
burdens" test and affirmed the summary judgment
ruling for the defendant-casino on the basis
that, although the plaintiff opposed the makeup
requirement, the requirement did not stereotype
or objectify women. 225 Finally, the court noted, the
plaintiff was not treated any differently than any other
man or woman who refused to follow the dress code.226
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B. Denied Medical Funding and Employee Dress
Codes
With the "unequal burden" test in mind,
imagine that the prisoner, the categorically needy
Medicaid recipient, and the non-incarcerated and
non-categorically needy taxpayer who can afford
to front the cost of gender-reassignment were all
born biologically male, but that each has a gender
expression of a traditionally gender-conforming
female. These three individuals express their
gender with a combination of makeup, dress, and
mannerisms. In this situation, the state medical
funding framework would interact with Title VII's
"unequal burdens" test to deny the prisoner and the
categorically needy Medicaid recipient access to jobs
with generally applicable dress codes. For example,
the prisoner, having been denied medical treatment
beyond psychotherapy, leaves prison as a preoperative
gender-variant person assigned male at birth. The
prisoner, with male anatomy and female gender
expression, may be subjected to legal employment
discrimination based on dress and appearance, so
long as the dress code is generally applicable to all
employees and imposes an equal burden on males
and females.227 The categorically needy Medicaid
recipient faces a similar situation: higher paying jobs
are more likely to have dress codes, which would bar
the categorically needy individual from obtaining
those jobs and their higher wages, which, in turn,
has the potential to entrench the Medicaid recipient's
status as "categorically needy." Meanwhile, the non-
incarcerated, non-categorically needy taxpayer who
can afford to front the cost of the procedure receives
government-subsidized surgery that allows the
individual to "pass" as a sex-gender aligned female,
free of the dress code requirements that frustrate the
prisoner and the Medicaid recipient.
The prisoner and the Medicaid recipient are
not without alternatives. For instance, in the example
above, they may choose to suppress their gender
expression and try to live as gender-conforming
males. However, for most gender-variant people
this is not a real option. In most cases, the immense
distress associated with GID, if untreated, can lead to
depression, auto-castration, or suicide.228
VI. Conclusion
The physical body has an "inescapable role" in
the formation of our identities. 229 For gender-variant
people, the physical body is especially important
because it is the tool that permits or denies access
to a socially legible gender identity that matches the
individual's self-perceived gender. But relying on the
medical model of gender in state medical assistance
claims largely fails to get gender-variant people any
closer to the bodies they want; even worse, logical
inconsistencies within court opinions suggest a
judicial apathy towards gender expression.
In this context, the medical model essentially
separates the agent from the object; that is, because
medical care that would permit gender-variant
people to alter their physical bodies is prohibitively
expensive without insurance,230 and most do not have
insurance, 231 they must place their bodies under state
control - to shape, or, in most cases, to not shape.
By denying gender-variant people agency in their
pursuit of socially and culturally legible bodies, the
medical model freezes gender expression and inhibits
progress in medically transitioning.
However, this type of control by the state
may actually facilitate a flourishing gender-variant
community by forcing gender-variant people to
violate social and cultural norms.232 The decidedly
low success rate for claims made by gender-variant
Medicaid recipients and gender-variant inmates has
had the unintended effect of amassing a community
of gender-variant people whose gender expression and
anatomically sexed bodies place them in the gray area
between the traditional male-female binary. From
this position in between the binary, gender-variant
people can challenge social and cultural conceptions
of gender expression.
This requires pushing back against the
medical model's essentialist conception of gender and
the conservative gender norms that it promotes. Many
gender-variant people seeking gender reassignment
surgery falsely endorse the medical model as a means
to their desired ends. 233 But for the majority of
gender-variant people who live in poverty, and for
gender-variant prisoners, those desired ends do not
follow from the false endorsement. Thus, for most
gender-variant people, adopting the medical model in
requests for state medical assistance means adopting
the model's strictures without a counterbalancing
benefit.
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In her formulation of gender identity as
inseparable from the social and cultural contexts in
which it is formed, Judith Butler explains that
[t]here is no self that is prior to the
convergence [of the physical body
and social and cultural norms] or
who maintains 'integrity' prior to its
entrance into this conflicted cultural
field. There is only a taking up of the
tools where they lie, where the very
'taking up' is enabled by the tool
lying there.2
Relying on the medical model of gender
to the current extent suggests that society lacks the
"tools" to interpret bodies that fall outside of the
traditional male-female binary. Even if one accepts this
as true, it does not follow that the medical model is
the only other avenue. Rather, by challenging existing
norms of interpretation, gender-variant people as a
subculture can seek to reclaim agency by creating new
tools of performance.
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(citing Keehner v. Dunn, 409 E Supp. 2d 1266, 1272
(D. Kan. 2006) for the proposition that the Eighth
Amendment is only available to prisoners, but the
Fourteenth Amendment "provides the same degree of
medical attention to pretrial detainees as the Eighth
Amendment does for inmates"); see also, supra, note 2.
6 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396 (a) (2006) (defining
"categorically needy" as individuals who receive
supplemental security income or whose family income
does not pass a certain state-determined threshold).
This section also includes dozens of other ways to
qualify for Medicaid funding, including through
pregnancy, poverty and age of minority, an adoption
assistance agreement, or proof of a medical disability.
Id.
7 Id. § 1396 (a)-(d) (2006); see also Smith v.
Rasmussen (Rasmussen II), 249 E3d 755 (8th Cir.
2000). Rasmussen II is a due process case discussed
at greater length in Part III of this Note. See Part III,
infra, for more of the facts of this case.
8 I.R.C. § 213 (a); see also O'Donnabhain v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 134 T.C. 34,
48 (U.S. Tax Ct. 2010). O'Donnabhain involved a
petition for redetermination of the plaintiff's income
taxes and is discussed at greater length in this Note.
See Infra Part III.C..
9 This issue is discussed further in Part III of this
Note. The Eighth Amendment cause of action is
judicially created. Alvin Lee, Trans Models in Prison:
The Medicalization of Gender Identity Disorder and
the Eighth Amendment Right to Gender Reassignment
Therapy, 31 HARv. J. L. & GENDER 447, 463 (2008).
A Medicaid pensioner's due process claim is partly
created by the Fourteenth Amendment, and partly
created by judicial interpretation. U.S. Const. amend.
XIV § 1; Lee, supra, at 460.
10 Furthermore, it is worth noting that the degree of
government control over the individual parallels the
degree of judicial deference, so that the judiciary is
most likely to defer to the judgment of government
administrators where the administrators' control
is most absolute. At the same time, administrative
control signals a restriction upon an individual's
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liberty, and greater administrative control is typically
associated with lower socioeconomic status.
" As discussed later in this Note, an estimated
seventy percent of transsexuals in the United States
are considered socioeconomically disadvantaged.
State of Transgender Calfornia, Economic Health of
Transgender Californians, TRANSGENDER LAw CENTER
1, 3 (2009), http://www.transgenderlawcenter.org/
pdf /StateofTransCAFINAL.pdf (explaining that
twenty percent of the individuals responding to the
survey report being homeless ever since coming out
as transgender); see also Travis Cox, Medically Necessary
Treatments for Transgender Prisoners and the Misguided
Law in Wisconsin, 24 Wis. J. L. GENDER & Soc'y 341,
361 (2009). The parties in Sundstrom v. Frank, No.
06-C-112, 2007 U.S. DIST. LEXIS 76597 (E.D. Wis.
2007), an Eighth Amendment challenge by a class of
inmates, compared the cost of gender reassignment
surgeries with other procedures that prisons are will
to provide, such as kidney transplants ($33,000) and
coronary bypass surgeries ($37,000).
12 See infra Part III.C (discussing medical deductions
under the tax code).
13 See infra Part III.A (discussing Eighth Amendment
claims and GRS).
14 Consider a case where the patient is inflicted with
a mortal wound instead of GID - a gunshot wound,
for instance. The medical necessity of a gunshot
wound is obvious, and establishing the medical
necessity of mending procedures would likely not
require a diagnosis or physician testimony, regardless
of the victim's status. Now consider a malignant
tumor. Although the condition is not visually obvious
in the manner that a gunshot wound is, the condition
has legitimacy in that, generally speaking, most
people recognize that malignant tumors are often
fatal. Thus, once it is established that the patient has a
malignant tumor, the medical necessity is clear. GID,
however, is both unobvious and, to many individuals
who are unaware of gender as a separate concept
from anatomical sex, counterintuitive, and medical
diagnoses and physician testimony does little to shake
its perceived illegitimacy.
15 See, e.g., Andrew Gilden, Toward a More
Transformative Approach: The Limits of Transgender
Formal Equality, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JusT. 83,
86-88 (2008) (outlining the development of the sex/
gender dichotomy).
16 Id. at 86-88.
17 Id. at 88-90.
18 Id.
19 JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE
SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 33 (1990).
20 Id.(stating a corollary to Friedrich Nietzsche's
idea that "there is no 'being' behind doing, effecting,
becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the
deed - the deed is everything").
21 See Gowri Ramachandran, Against the Right to
Bodily Integrity: Of Cyborgs and Human Rights, 87
DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 36 (2009).
22 Id. at 34.
23 See Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and
Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the
Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1179
(2004). Professor Rich details the various ways in
which physical bodies and their performative acts
are identified and categorized in presumably "stable"
categories of race and ethnicity. Professor Rich
persuasively argues that the Title VII protections
should extend to the "voluntary," performative acts
"which, by accident or design, communicate[ ] racial
or ethnic identity or status." Id. at 1139.
24 Spade, supra note 3, at 23.
25 See Standards of Care, supra note 2, at 11-22.
26 See infra Part II.B (discussing the costs of sex-
reassignment surgery).
27 See infra Part III (detailing the obstacles faced
by specific plaintiffs); see also infra Part IV (explaining
how the medicalization of gender has made many
transsexuals dependent on the medical community
for diagnoses).
28 DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N 261-66 (3d ed.
1980) [hereinafter DSM-I].
29 See DSM-IV, supra note 2, at 532-38.
30 See DSM-III, supra note 28, at 1-5; DSM-IV,
supra note 2, at 532-38.
3 Standards of Care, supra note 2, at 4.
32 See DSM-III, supra note 28, at 261-62.
33 Judith S. Stern, Brian L. V Administration
for Childrens Services: Ambivalence Toward Gender
Identity Disorder as a Medical Condition, 30 WOMEN'S
RTS. L. REP. 566, 568 (2009).
1 Id. at 569.
35 Id. This change had the secondary effect of
differentiating the terms "transgender," "transsexual,"
and "gender identity disorder": "transgender" is an
umbrella term referring to individuals with cross-
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gender identifications, and "gender identity disorder"
applies only to transsexuals whose cross-gender
identification causes them "clinically significant
distress or impairment" in certain situations.
36 DSM-5 Development: Timeline, AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, (2010), http://www.dsm5.
org/about/Pages/ Timeline.aspx.
3 DSM-5 Development: Gender Identity Disorder
in Adolescents or Adults, Rationale, AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION (2010), http://www.dsm5.
org/ProposedRevisions/Pages/proposedrevision.
aspx?rid=482#.
38 Id.
39 See Standards of Care, supra note 2, at 4-5. The
Standards of Care summarize the diagnostic process
as follows:
A clinical threshold is passed when
concerns, uncertainties, and ques-
tions about gender identity persist
during a person's development,
become so intense as to seem to be the
most important aspect of a person's
life, or prevent the establishment
of a relatively unconflicted gender
identity. . . . . These reflect various
degrees of personal dissatisfaction
with sexual identity, sex and gender
demarcating body characteristics,
gender roles, gender identity, and
the perceptions of others. When dis-
satisfied individuals meet specified
criteria in one of two official nomen-
clatures . . . they are formally desig-
nated as suffering from a gender iden-
tity disorder (GID). Some persons
with GID exceed another thresh-
old - they persistently possess a
wish for surgical transformation of
their bodies.
Standards of Care, supra note 7, at 2. Standards of Care
endorse diagnoses from either the DSM-IV or the
International Classification of Diseases- 10 (ICD- 10),
which the author of the Standards of Care predict will
be synthesized in the future. Id. at 6. The criteria used
to diagnose gender identity disorder in the DSM-IV
are as follows:
A. A strong and persistent cross-gender identification
(not merely a desire for any perceived cultural
advantages of being the other sex).
In adolescents and adults, the dis-
turbance is manifested by symptoms
such as a stated desire to be the other
sex, frequent passing as the other
sex, desire to live or be treated as the
other sex, or the conviction that he
or she has the typical feelings and
reactions of the other sex.
B. Persistent discomfort with his or
her sex or sense of inappropriateness
in the gender role of that sex.
In adolescents and adults, the dis-
turbance is manifested by symptoms
such as preoccupation with getting
rid of primary and secondary sex
characteristics (e.g., request for hor-
mones, surgery, or other procedures
to physically alter sexual character-
istics to simulate the other sex) or
belief that he or she was born the
wrong sex.
C. The disturbance is not concurrent
with a physical intersex condition.
D. The disturbance causes clinically
significant distress or impairment in
social, occupational, or other impor-
tant areas of functioning.
DSM-IV, supra note 2, at 537-38.The seventh
edition of the WPATH, released in September 2011,
makes several significant changes to procedures
(psychotherapy is no longer required; nor is it
required that the individual live one year as the desired
gender; new standards for hormone therapy) and
diagnostic criteria ("broader spectrum of identities"),
as well as to the general approach ("It's more about
what the professionals have to do' and not about
transgender people having to prove their health needs
to the professional"), to gender variance. Dyana
Bagby, WPATH Announces New Standards of Care
for Transgender and Gender Nonconforming People,
GAVOICE (Sept. 25, 2011), http://www.thegavoice.
com/index.php/news/national-news/3497-wpath-
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announces-new-standards-of-care-for-transgender-
and-gender-nonconforming-people.
40 Id. at 11-22.
41 Lee, supra note 9, at 459.
42 Id. at 458-59; see also Standards of Care, supra note
2, at 12 (describing the role of the psychotherapist as
helping patient into long-term transition and making
sure patient is ready as well as eligible).
4 Stern, supra note 33, at 570-71.
4 Id. at 57 1 o.
4 Id; Standards of Care, supra note 2, at 3.
46 Standards of Care, supra note 2, at 1-2, 12.
4 Id. at 18-19.
48 Cox, supra note 11, at 361. The parties in
Sundstrom v. Frank, No. 06-C-112, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 76597 (E.D. Wis. 2007), an Eighth
Amendment challenge by a class of inmates, compared
the cost of gender reassignment surgeries with other
procedures that prisons are will to provide, such as
kidney transplants ($33,000) and coronary bypass
surgeries ($37,000).
49 Id.
50 See Standards of Care, supra note 2, at 20.
5 See Casillas v. Daines, 580 E Supp. 2d 235,
237 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (transsexual plaintiff received
hormone therapy for more than twenty-five years);
Barnhill v. Cheery, No. 8:06-CV-922-T-23TGW,
2008 WL 759322, at *1 (M.D. Fla. March 20, 2008)
(transsexual plaintiff treated with hormone therapy
for more than fifteen years).
52 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
5 See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
1 See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103
(holding that the Eighth Amendment requires that a
prison provide medical treatment to those prisoners
in its care).
1 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (a)-(d); see, e.g., Pinneke v.
Preisser, 623 E2d 546, 548-49 (8th Cir. 1980).
56 Pinneke, 623 F.2d at 547.
5 I.R.C. § 213; O'Donnabhain v. Comm'r of
Internal Revenue, 134 T.C. 34, 48 (U.S. Tax Ct.
2010).
58 Barnhill v. Cheery, No. 8:06-CV-922-T-23TGW,
2008 WL 759322, at *14 (M.D. Fla. March 20,
2008) (quoting Maggert v. Hanks, 131 E3d 670, 671
(7th Cir. 1997), and Judge Posner, who explained
that prisons are not required to provide individualized
medical evaluations).
" De'Lonta v. Angelone, 330 E3d 630, 634 (4th
Cir. 2003) (quoting Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d
1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993)).
60 See, e.g., Gammett v. Idaho Bd. of Corr., No.
CV05-257-S-MHW, 2007 WL 2186896, at *3 (D.
Idaho July 27, 2007) ("The Courts have consistently
considered Gender Identity Disorder (including
transsexualism or transgenderism) to be a serious
medical condition for purposes of the Eighth
Amendment.")
61 Barnhill, 2008 WL 759322 at *11 (quoting
Kelley v. Hicks, 400 E3d 1282, 1284, n.3 (11th Cir.
2005)).
62 See, e.g., Cooper v. Dyke, 814 F.2d 941, 945 (4th
Cit. 1987) (untreated bullet wound).
63 See, e.g., Sosebee v. Murphy, 797 E2d 179,
180-81 (4th Cir.1986) (guards knew of inmate's
serious illness and inmate died).
64 Barnhill, 2008 WL 759322 at *11 (citing
Bozeman v. Orum, 422 E3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cit.
2005)).
61 Id. (quoting Harris v. Thigpen, 941 E2d 1495,
1510 (11th Cir. 1991)).
66 See, e.g., Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 E2d 408,
413 (7th Cir. 1987).
67 Barnhill, 2008 WL 759322 at *10 (quoting
Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1504 (11th Cir.
1991)).
68 221 E Supp. 2d 156 (D. Mass. 2002).
69 Id. at 165, 168 n.4.
70 Id. at 161.
71 Id. at 184.
72 Id. at 159.
73 Id. at 161.
7 Id. at 160.
75 Id. at 165.
76 Id. at 175.
n Id. at 190.
78 Id. at 191.
7 Id. at 161.
" Id. As a preliminary matter, the court recognized
that the Commissioner of the DOC was typically not
the defendant in Eighth Amendment cases; however,
because the Commissioner in this case issued a
blanket policy that prohibited doctors from attending
to the plaintiff, the Commissioner made most of the
medical judgments and was thus properly named as
the defendant.Id. Later, with respect to the subjective
prong, the court excused the Commissioner's poor
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judgment because he was "not qualified to make
medical judgments." Id. at 191.
81 Id. at 161. Later in the opinion, the court
appeared to forgive the Commissioner's misjudgment,
stating that he " "knew the underlying facts but
believed (albeit unsoundly) that the risk to which the
facts gave rise was insubstantial or nonexistent."
82 Id. at 162.
42 U.S.C. § 1396; Smith v. Rasmussen (Rasmussen
II), 249 F3d 755, 757 (8th Cir. 2000).
8 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (a) (17).
85 Rasmussen II, 249 E 3d at 759 (quoting Beal v.
Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977)). The objectives of
the Medicaid Act, according to the Appropriations
subsection, 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1, is to "enabl[e] each
State, as far as practicable under the conditions in
such State, to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf
of families with dependent children and of aged, blind,
or disabled individuals, whose income and resources
are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical
services, and (2) rehabilitation and other services to
help such families and individuals attain or retain
capability for independence or self-care. . . ."
A sparsely reasoned 2009 per curium decision by the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals clarified that the
state and the treating physician both "have roles in
determining what medical measures [are] necessary
to 'correct or ameliorate"' a patient's condition.
Moore v. Meadows, 324 Fed. Appx. 773, 774
(11th Cir. 2009) (per curium). Though this could
affect an eleventh circuit court's analysis of future
Medicaid claims, this decision does not affect the
analysis of the two previously decided Eighth Circuit
Medicaid cases discussed below.
86 See Meriwether v. Falkner, 821 F.2d 408, 412-13
(7th Cit. 1987) (medically necessary treatment
for transsexualism); Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d
546, 548 (8th Cir. 1980) (calling surgery the "only
[known] medical treatment available to relieve or
solve the problems of a true transsexual"); G.B. v.
Lackner, 145 Cal. Rptr. 555, 558-590 (Ct. App.
1978) (holding that transsexual surgery is not
'cosmetic surgery' under provision of Code of State
Director of Health disallowing Medi-Cal benefits
for 'cosmetic surgery."'); J.D. v. Lackner, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 570, 572 (Ct. App. 1978) (holding that Medi-
Cal benefits would be available for transsexual
surgery to claimant who suffered from severe gender
dysphoria or transsexualism for radical sex conversion
surgery); Doe v. State Dept. of Public Welfare, 257
N.W2d 816, 819 (Minn. 1977) (holding total
exclusion of 'transsexual surgery' void and arbitrary in
contravention of Social Security Act).
" See Ravenwood v. Daines, No. 06-Cv-6355-
CJS, 2009 WL 2163105, at *12 (WD.N.Y. July 12,
2009) (granting defendants summary judgment on
claim that denial of funds for gender reassignment
surgery violated due process); Casillas v. Daies, 580
F. Supp. 2d 235, 246-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (denying
GID plaintiff's equal protection claim); Rasmussen
II, 249 F.3d at 761-62 (denying due process claim
because medical community questions efficacy of
treatment); Rush v. Johnson, 565 E Supp. 856, 869
(N.D. Ga. 1983) (upholding exclusion of gender
reassignment surgery because the state determined
"there is no authoritative evidence that the surgery
is safe and effective").
88 Compare Rasmussen II, 249 F.3d at 761-62
(upholding, in 2001, a Medicaid exclusion because
defendant's doctors assert that there is no consensus
in medical community as to efficacy of gender
reassignment surgery) with Pinneke, 623 E2d at
550 (invalidating the state's categorical exclusion of
gender reassignment surgery because "the decision
of whether or not certain treatment or a particular
type of surgery is 'medically necessary' rests with the
individual recipient's physician and not with clerical
personnel or government officials").
" See cases cited supra note 88. These arguments
include assertions that gender reassignment surgery is
merely "cosmetic," or "experimental," see, e.g., G.B. v.
Lackner, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 556-67, and that it could
never be medically necessary to "remove healthy,
undamaged organs and tissues," see, e.g., Pinneke, 623
F.2d at 549.
90 See cases cited supra note 89; see also discussion of
Moore, supra note 89.
91 623 E2d at 549.
92 249 F.3d at 761-62.
93 At the time of this case, in 1980, this term was
still used to describe gender-variant individuals.
9 623 F.2d at 547.
9 Id. at 548.
96 257 N.W 2d 816, 819-21 (Minn. 1977).
91 Id. at 819.
98 Id. Thus, though the Doe court ruled in favor
of the gender-variant plaintiff and approved medical
treatment, the reasoning appears to be grounded
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more in pity than in understanding. Furthermore,
the Doe court attributes the idea of "preventing
transsexualism" to another court, which means that at
least two decisions favorable to gender-variant people
came from courts that thought of gender variance as
something congenital that could be prevented before
childbirth. Id.
* Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 E2d 546, 548 (8th Cir.
1980).
100 Id. at 550.
101 See, e.g., Smith v. Rasmussen (Rasmussen fl),
249 F3d 755 (8th Cir. 2000); Smith v. Rasmussen
(Rasmussen 1), 57 F. Supp. 2d 736, 763 (N.D. Iowa
1999) (quoting Pinneke, 623 F.2d at 549); see also
Smith v. Palmer, 24 E Supp. 955, 967-68 (N.D. Iowa
1998); Weaver v. Reagen, 886 E 2d 194, 199-2000
(8th Cit. 1989) (Missouri).
102 249 E3d 755 rev' Rasmussen I, 57 E Supp.
2d 736.
103 Rasmussen II, 249 E3d at 758.
104 Id. at 760.
105 Id.
106 Rasmussen , 57 E Supp. 2d 736, 757 (N.D. Iowa
1999), rev'd, Rasmussen II, 249 F.3d 755 (8th Cir.
2000).
107 Id. at 758.
108 Rasmussen II, 249 E3d 755, 760 (8th Cit. 2000).
109 Id. at 761.
110 Id.
ill Id. at 759 (emphasis added).
112 I.R.C § 213 (a) (2006). Expenses are deductible
only to the extent that they exceed 7.5 percent of gross
income and the individual has not been otherwise
compensated for the expenditures, through private
medical insurance, for example. Id. § 213 (d) (1) (A)
(2008).
113 Id. §213 (d) (1) (A).
114 Id. § 213 (d) (9) (B).
115 Id. § 213 (d) (9) (A).
116 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, 386 So.2d 468,
470-71 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980).
117 Id. at 470 (citing testimony of surgeon who
opined that breast reduction surgery might ease the
taxpayer's back problems).
118 134 T.C. 34 (U.S. Tax Ct. 2010).
119 Id. at 5 3.
120 Id. at 34.
121 Id. at 36.
122 Id. at 40-41.
123 Id. at 52.
124 Id. at 52.
125 Id. at 64.
126 Id. at 74-76. The plaintiff did, however, provide
expert testimony in support of her claim that
her gender reassignment surgery was "medically
necessary." Id.
127 Id. at 42-48, 74.
128 Id. at 55-63.
129 Id. at 43.
130 Id. at 69 (quoting Havey v. Commissioner,
12 T.C. 409, 412 (U.S. Tax Ct. 1949).
131 Id. at 73.
132 Lee, supra note 9, at 462.
133 Id. at 463.
134 See, e.g., Barnhill v. Cheery, No. 8:06-CV-922-T-
23TGW, 2008 WL 759322 1, at *11 -*12 (M.D. Fla.
March 20, 2008).
135 Jerry L. Dasti, Advocating a Broader Understanding
of the Necessity of Sex-Reassignment Surgery under
Medicaid, 77 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1738, 1756 (2002).
136 Id. at 1757.
137 Id.
138 See, e.g., Grier v. Goetz, 402 E Supp. 2d 876,
912 (citing cases upholding restrictions on inpatient
visits and quoting the Supreme Court's decision in
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 303 (1985),
that "Medicaid programs do not guarantee that each
recipient will receive that level of health care precisely
tailored to his or her particular needs. Instead, the
benefit provided through Medicaid is a particular
package of health care services, such as 14 days of
inpatient coverage. That package of services has the
general aim of assuring that individuals will receive
necessary medical care, but the benefit provided
remains the individual services offered - not
'adequate health care.")
139 I.R.C. § 213.
140 See § 213 (d) (1) (A).
141 See§ 213
142 In O'Donnabhain v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue,
143 T.C. 34, 48 (U.S. Tax Ct. 2010), the plaintiff
was allowed to deduct her medical expenditures from
her taxable income. Id. at 34. This has the same total
effect as a government subsidy. For example, if the
plaintiff has a taxable income of $50,000, he or she
will pay twenty-five percent in federal income taxes,
or $12,500. If the plaintiff is allowed to deduct her
$25,000 procedure from her taxable income, then
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plaintiff has a total taxable income of $25,000 and
pays the government only $6,250 in taxes. This result
is essentially the same as if the government had given
the plaintiff $6,250 (or $12,500 minus $6,250) to
go toward her surgical procedures. The amount of
the "subsidy," as a proportion of the total cost of the
procedure, increases with affluence: an individual
with a taxable income of $250,000 would be in a
higher tax bracket and the "subsidy" would equal the
tax rate multiplied by the cost of the procedure (e.g.,
forty percent tax rate and a $25,000 operation means
patient pays $90,000 in taxes, rather than $100,000).
143 2008 WL 759322 1, at *14 (M.D. Fla. March
20, 2008).
144 See id. at *12 ("Deference to the informed
judgment of the prison officials is especially
appropriate here, since there is disagreement
among experts regarding the proper treatment for
transsexualism, and female hormone therapy is highly
controversial due to its health risks.")
15 Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 E Supp. 2d 156, 191
(D. Mass. 2002); see supra note 81 and accompanying
text.
146 Smith v. Rasmussen (Rasmussen II), 249 F.3d
755, 760-61 (8th Cir. 2000).
147 Id. at 761.
148 Id. at 759.
149 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
I'm not sure what this is citing to. 141 (below), refers
to a different case.
10 O'Donnabhain v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue,
134 T.C. 34, 69 (2010).
151 Mata v. Saiz, 427 E3d 745, 751 (10th Cir. 2005).
152 Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
837).
153 Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 E Supp. 2d 156, 190 (D.
Mass. 2002).
" Id. at 191.
155 Giroux v. Somerset County, 178 F.3d 28, 33-34
(1st Cir. 1999).
156 Id. at 30.
157 Id. at 33.
158 Id.
159 Id. The court stated that "cell feed" indicates that
the prisoner is either ill or in protective custody; two
options, only one of which suggests that the inmate is
"vulnerable to attack." Id.
160 See Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 E Supp. 2d 156,
190-91 (D. Mass. 2002).
161 Id. at 176.
162 Id.
6 See, e.g., id. at 163-64 (detailing inmate's
lifelong struggle to obtain gender reassignment);
see also Spade, supra note 3, at 19-22 .
164 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
165 See Standards of Care, supra note 2, at 11-17.
166 Id.
167 See Spade, supra note 3, at 20.
168 See Susan Etta Keller, Crisis ofAuthority: Medical
Rhetoric and Transsexual Identity, 11 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 51, 54 (1999).
169 Spade, supra note 3, at 19.
170 See id. at 20. In recounting his own experience
convincing doctors of his need for gender reassignment
Spade writes:
I've worked hard to not engage the gay childhood
narrative - I never talk about tomboyish behavior
as an antecedent to my lesbian identity, I don't tell
stories about cross-dressing or crushes on girls, and
I intentionally fuck with the assumption of it by
telling people how I used to be straight and have sex
with boys like any sweet trashy rural girl. I see these
narratives as strategic, and I've always rejected the
strategy that adopts some theory of innate sexuality
and forecloses the possibility that anyone, gender
troubled childhood or not, could transgress sexual and
gender norms at any time. I don't want to participate
in an idea that only some people have to struggle to
learn gender norms in childhood.
171 Id. at 24.
172 See David Marcus, The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Legal Realism as a Jurisprudence ofLaw
Reform, 44 GA. L. REv. 433, 473 (2010) ("Common
law pleading required that the contours of the forms
of action, not practical considerations or concerns of
justice, dictate the boundaries and progress of suits.
[FN213] A nineteenth-century plaintiff, for example,
could not obtain relief unless his claims fit one of
what amounted to a fourteenth-century writ.")
173 Spade, supra note 3, at 20.
174 See Keller, supra note 168, at 53-56.
175 Demoya R. Gordon, Transgender Legal Advocacy:
What do Feminist Legal Theories Have to Offer?, 97
CAL. L. REv. 1719, 1747 (2009) (quoting Gary Peller,
Reason and the Mob: The Politics of Representation,
TIKKUN, July/Aug 1987, at 30 ).
176 See, e.g., DSM-IV, supra note 2, at 535-36.
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177 See Spade, supra note 3, at 23-24; Keller, supra
note 168, at 55-56.
178 See supra note 177.
179 Keller, supra note 168, at 55.
180 Spade, supra note 3, at 26-28.
181 Id
182 DSM-IV, supra note 2, at 532-38.
183 See, e.g., Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 E2d 546, 548
(8th Cir. 1980).
184 See, e.g., id.; see also supra note 88 and
accompanying text.
185 See Keller, supra note 168, at 51.
16 See supra Part III. B-C.
187 See, e.g. Smith v. Rasmussen (Rasmussen fl), 249
E3d 755, 760 (8th Cit. 2000) (defendant claims
surgery is experimental) and see Pinnke v. Preisser,
623 E2d 546, 569 (8th Cit. 1980) (defendant claims
surgery is experimental).
188 See O'Donnabhain v. Comm'r of Internal
Revenue, 143 T.C. 3455-56 (U.S. Tax Ct. 2010).
1I In this Note I adopt Rachel Pollack's term
"gatekeepers," the authorities that stand between
an individual with GID and the treatment that
individual seeks, who Pollack describes as "those who
would seize the power of life and death by demanding
that transsexuals satisfy an arbitrary standard." A at 20
(quoting Rachel Pollack, The Varieties of Transsexual
Experience, 7 Transsexual News Telegraph 18, 20
(1997)).
190 See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
191 See supra Part IV.A
192 See Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 E Supp. 2d 156, 165
(D. Mass. 2002).
193 See Smith v. Rasmussen (Rasmussen l), 249 E3d
755, 757-58 (8th Cir. 2000).
194 See O'Donnabhain v. Comm'r Internal Revenue,
134 T.C. No. 4 1 (U.S. Tax Ct. 2010).
195 See supra Part III.
116 See, e.g., Rasmussen II, 249 E3d at 760.
197 See Cox, supra note 11, at 360.
19 See I.R.C. § 213; O'Donnabhain v. Comm'r
of Internal Revenue, 134 T.C.34, 48 (U.S. Tax Ct.
2010).
19 See supra Part III.
200 See Spade, supra note 3, at 23.
201 See Ramachandran, supra note 21, at 35.
202 See Cox, supra note 11, at 359. This is especially
true given "poverty plagues the transgender
community," and studies indicate as much as "70%
of the transgender population in the United States is
unemployed." Id.
203 Keller, supra note 168, at 53.
204 Id. at 53-54. This assumption is probably a safe
one; to say otherwise would suggest that the medical
model created the disjunction underlying gender
identity disorder, which concedes far more than what
these scholars claim.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 See Dasti, supra note 135, at 1758-60.
208 Keller, supra note 168, at 56, 59.
209 Id. at 56.
210 Id. at 59 (explaining that transsexuals are
disempowered by the medical model but have few
alternatives other than abandoning transsexualism
altogether).
211 Id. at 54 (citing Gordene Olga MacKenzie,
TRANSGENDER NATION 71 (1994)).
212 Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000 (e) (2006).
213 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
258 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Right Act of
1991.
214 See Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 E3d
1104,1113 (9th Cit. 2006).
215 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006).
216 Jesperson v. Harrah's Operating Co., 392 E 3d
1076, 1080 (9th Cit. 2004), reh'gen banc granted, 409
E3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005), aff'd, 444 E3d 1061 (9th
Cir. 2006).
217 Id. at 1081.
218 Jespersen, 444 E3d at 1114 n.2. (1989) (Pregerson,
J., dissenting).
219 Id. at 1109-11.
220 Id. at 1117.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 392 E3d
1076, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004), reh'en banc granted, 409
E3d 1061 (9th Cit. 2005), aff'd, 444 E3d 1104 (9th
Cit. 2006).
224 See id.
225 Jesperson, 444 E3d at 1113.
226 Id.
THE MODERN AMI EIl('AN62
227 Jesperson v. Harrah's Operating Co, 392 E3d
1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004); Schroer v. Billington,
577 E Supp. 2d 293, 304 (D.C. Cir. 2006). - Court
in Schroer distinguishes based on the facts and doesn't
discuss generally applicable policies - maybe not the
best supporting authority for this premise.
228 L.M. Lothstein, The Aging Gender Dysphoria
(Transsexual) Patient, 8 ARCH. SEX. BEHAV. 431, 434-36
(1979).
229 Ramachandran, supra note 21, at 34.
230 See supra p. 14.
231 Dylan Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding
the Law: Toward a Social and Legal Conceptualization
of Gender That Is More Inclusive of Transgender People,
11 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 253, 269 (2005) (reporting
that a number of studies indicate that around half of
transgender respondents have health insurance).
232 See Ramachandran, supra note 21, at 41
(suggesting that capitalism provided the space for gay
and lesbian subcultures to flourish).
233 See, e.g., Spade, supra note 3.
234 See Butler, supra note 19, at 144-45.
FALL 2011 63
